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1. Introduction 
 
There is an ongoing debate on whether corporate governance systems of major 
economies are converging towards common standards. Some academics argue that 
globalization will lead to a single corporate governance model which is quite similar to 
the Anglo-American one (e.g. Coffee, 1999). Other academics argue that such a 
globalization will not happen (e.g. Branson, 2000). Hansmann and Kraakman argue that 
corporate governance practices and corporate law of different countries will converge. 
Because of the overall globalization and the financial crises in the world, managers and 
owners of companies have to think over their present strategy, their governance systems 
and the challenges posed by such questions. 
The goal of my diploma thesis is to introduce the development of corporate governance 
systems in the last two decades, and to find out if there is a relationship between 
globalization’s degree and convergence. 
Corporate governance is not more than administration and control of a company. For a 
better understanding it is necessary to give a more detailed definition of corporate 
governance and to define the members who participate in a corporate governance 
system. These participants play different roles depending if they are internal or external 
institutions. 
To be able to compare the different kind of governance systems, the possible 
composition of these systems will be also defined.  
Since there are many countries with different corporate governance determinants in the 
world, the development of several corporate governance systems is evident. Therefore 
some of these systems should be introduced and analyzed in order to have an overview 
about the functioning of corporate governance systems from all around the world.  
I choose those corporate governance systems by which other systems are the most 
affected. Because the United States’ economy influences the world economy 
significantly, and its corporate governance structure is based on the same factors as the 
British one, the first chosen system will be the Anglo-Saxon system. 
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One of continental Europe’s most significant economies is Germany, which also affects 
other countries’ corporate governance. This is the reason why I chose the German 
system for comparison with other countries. 
To represent Asian corporate governance I introduce the Japanese system. I find the role 
of the Main Bank in corporate governance very interesting. 
The forth system I choose is an example of the Latin countries: Spain. 
I will analyze these systems according to ownership structure, financial regulation, 
capital markets, labor markets and its regulations, debt structures, bankruptcy laws and 
banking supervision. 
After the analyses I am going to show the changes in the chosen systems in the last 
decades and investigate if they are converging to each other. 
The last part of the thesis will be about the firm performance. There are different factors 
which influence the firm performance. In my point of view the ownership structure is 
the most important factor regarding firm performance. I try to show its importance and 
its role in convergence of the different corporate governance systems. Furthermore I will 
show further approaches of corporate governance systems’ convergence and give a 
summary about studies in the last decades. Since takeover regulation is one of the most 
important factors of corporate governance in the last section I will write some words 
about its changes in the last years. 
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2. Corporate Governance Systems 
2.1 What is Corporate Governance? 
 
“Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders (employees, customers, creditors, 
suppliers, local communities, others), and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decision on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which 
the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance.” (OECD, 1999) 
A country’s corporate governance system influences the profitability and growth of 
companies in their decision makings. It also has an impact on the wealth created in a 
country. But countries’ corporate governance systems differ in their: 
 ownership structures of equity 
 structures of corporations 
 role of the banking system in the economies 
 business circumstances 
 efficient functioning of capital markets 
 level of competition in both domestic and international product and capital 
markets. 
In the case of a stock company, the company is „owned” by the shareholders, but actual 
management of the company is left to the managers. A system is required for checking 
whether the managers and the shareholders are acting in an adequate way with the firm’s 
interests. Further it is not only the shareholders that have close interests in the 
company’s activities. The customers support the company by buying the goods and 
services which in turn supplies its clients. The firm is further supported by the creditors 
who buy the bonds issued, by the national and local governments, by the community in 
which it is located, by the employees who choose the company as their place of work 
and by other companies which are selling their products for that company. A company 
has social responsibilities not only to its shareholders, but to these other parties as well. 
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To answer the question “which country’s corporate governance system is the best” we 
should analyze these systems. Of course if there is a “best system” no of other countries 
can overtake it because of the differences mentioned above. 
In the next part there will be a description about the different corporate governance 
systems. 
 
Figure 1. Members of Corporate Governance Systems 
 
 
2.2 Basic Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
 
One of corporate governance’s most important mechanisms is the market. There are 
three central markets, the managerial labor market, the firm’s capital and product 
market. 
All corporations in the world have boards of directors. They play a very important role 
in hiring, firing, monitoring and compensating the management. The goal is to 
maximize shareholder value. Theoretically the board is thought as an efficient corporate 
governance mechanism, but in reality its role is less clear. In the US, the board of 
directors contains some of the insiders who are to be monitored. In some cases they 
represent a majority of the board. It is not uncommon that the CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board. Board members are mostly chosen by the management which 
has an influence in determining other members. 
One of the most important elements of corporate governance is ownership structure. A 
greater coverage between control and ownership should cause a reduction in conflicts of 
interest and hence to higher firm value. 
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Shareholders other than management can potentially influence the actions taken by 
management. 
The board, the managers, and the shareholders have a horizontal and a vertical 
dimension. 
 
Figure 2. Vertical governance: Diffuse ownership 
 
 
Vertical governance is between distant shareholders and senior managers. It is very 
important that CEO and senior managers are loyal to shareholders and manage the 
company competently. This type of corporate governance is typical in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. 
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Figure 3. Horizontal governance: Controlling vs. minority shareholders in the 
public firm 
 
 
 
The horizontal governance is between dominant and dispersed shareholders. Dominant 
shareholders have more influence on senior managers and the board of directors than 
shareholders in the vertical model. This type of corporate governance is typical in 
Continental Europe. 
Horizontal governance is dominant in most of the world; vertical governance is typical 
in the United States. 
There exists another form of corporate governance dimension which belongs neither to 
the vertical nor to the horizontal dimension. This form governs the firm so that it is 
legitimate in its society and is a shallow for modern corporate governance in the United 
States. 
 
2.2.1 Internal and External Mechanisms 
2.2.1.1 Internal Mechanisms 
 
The most important internal mechanisms of corporate governance are the board of 
directors and its committees. They are responsible for monitoring, controlling the 
company’s activities and for decision-making. The effective functioning of board is 
influenced by its composition and size. Linck (2008) argues that the board structure 
reflects the firm’s industry, the need for monitoring of activities and the transparency of 
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the firm’s earnings. The level of board activity may be indicated by the frequency of 
board meetings. The board of directors consists of executive and non-executive 
directors. Executive directors are experts in their fields, while non-executives are 
professional directors. They monitor financial reporting and the board’s activities. 
Balance between executive and non-executive directors is needed. For effective 
functioning independence of non-executive directors is important. Chairpersons and 
chief executive officers play a fundamental role in companies’ life. Chairperson’s 
responsibility is that board’s activities are carried out correctly and that information 
comes directly to the directors. CEO supervises strategy and investments and informs 
the board. He is also responsible for the daily business. 
The second group of internal mechanisms are the audit committee, the internal control 
and the internal audit. Audit committee belongs to the group of non-executive directors. 
The most important characteristics of audit committee members are its independence. 
The board has primary responsibility for internal control, although it is often delegated 
to its audit committees. There are firms which keep internal audit function ‘in house’, 
while other use external opportunities or a mixture of the two. 
 
2.2.1.2 External Mechanisms 
 
External mechanisms control the shareholders and the board. Such mechanisms are for 
example blockholders and analysts. Managers can be forced by large blockholders to 
take actions for improving the firm’s value. External analysts are very effective at 
monitoring by collecting data from different sources. They create useful reports which 
help in decision-making. 
External auditors play a very important role in corporate governance. Their independent 
reports give investors a better and more reliable overview about a company’s financial 
status. 
Competition forces firms to take actions which are in the shareholders’ best interest. 
Takeovers can also influence senior management’s decision-making. To protect 
shareholders regulation and enforcement are the most important external institutions. La 
Porta (1998) found that countries whose legal system is grounded in common law have 
a higher level of minority shareholder protection than civil law countries. In recent 
years the level of protection across countries has converged a little.  
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2.3 Corporate Governance Systems – Differences 
 
Within a company there are incomplete contracts between shareholders, managers, 
creditors, employees and customers. Between these actors exist transaction costs which 
are paid for the coordination processes. There are three relationship types which can be 
determined as having transaction costs: 
- shareholders and managers 
- majority and minority shareholders 
- shareholders and other stakeholders 
Company law regulates these relationships and tries to minimize the transaction costs 
between stakeholders. 
The members of Board of directors are utility maximizers and therefore represent not 
always the best interest of all stakeholders. Since agency problems are solved by good 
governance, reorganization of governance structure is eventually needed. Agency 
problems can be solved in different ways. We distinguish between one-tier and two-tier 
systems. 
 
 
2.3.1 One-tier and two-tier Systems 
 
The one-tier board system has only an administrative organ. It has the common 
responsibility of its members for the management and control. It ensures that the 
necessary information will be available to all its members by direct information access. 
This fact allows being flexible for board organization and this form of corporate 
governance is also able to make decisions faster. Independent non-executive directors 
have a control function. The common principles are laid down for example in the 
United Kingdom in the Combined Code (2003) which is part of the listing requirements 
at the London Stock Exchange. Since the shareholders’ interest is very important, 
directors cannot be the CEO. Problems in the one-tier system can be caused by the lack 
of directors’ knowledge of information because they are dependent on CEO for 
reappointment. Therefore the independence of control does not exist. Board committees 
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play a very important role because they are independent consultants for board of 
directors. Audit committee is also part of listing requirements in stock exchanges. 
Two-tier board systems have both a supervisory- and a management organ. Supervisory 
board controls the management board which is responsible for shareholders and protects 
public interest. It also approves management decisions. Simultaneously is supervisory 
board dependent on management board, which can cause problems in the ownership 
structure. 
“Apart from this strong position of block holders in supervisory boards one might also 
view interlocking directorships as a problem of the two-tier board system. These 
directorships are established if a member of one supervisory board is also a member of 
one of more other supervisory or management boards of another company (Boehmer, 
2001)”1 
Management and control should be separated because of the inefficiency by working 
together. The optimal control can be hardly defined. Members of supervisory board are 
interested in avoiding conflicts and obtain cooperation they collect the information from 
the management board (from the board which should be controlled). The management 
organ is appointed by the management board which can make suggestions for the 
election of members for the supervisory-board.  
As already mentioned corporate governance systems differ in their ownership 
structures, financial regulations, capital markets, labor markets and its regulations, debt 
structures, bankruptcy laws and banking supervision. 
Importance of boards is strengthened by the implementation of Corporate Governance 
Codes all over the world. In the UK is the most important one the Cadbury Report 
(1992) which emphasizes the intensive monitoring of the executive management 
(Cadbury Report, 1.1). The most cited corporate governance principles are laid out by 
the OECD2 which is the common basis of most corporate governance codes. It is about 
the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders (e.g. German Corporate 
Governance Code, 2002, section 4; French Bouton Report, 2002, part 1; Japanese 
Corporate Governance Code, 2001, chapter 1). 
  
                                                 
1
 Udo C Braendle, Juergen Noll, The Societas Europaea – A Step Towards Convergence of Corporate 
Governance Systems, p.4.  
2
 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, published by the Ad Hoc Task Force of Corporate 
Governance, 19-Apr-1999, Paris (1999) 
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Figure 4. : Number of Corporate Governance Codes Published by Year 
 
 
Source: ECGI Codes Database (www.ecgi.org/codes) 
2.3.2 Insider and Outsider Model 
 
Many empirical studies found, that between countries exist differences regarding 
corporate ownership structure. A classic study is from Jensen and Meckling (1976) who 
integrated elements from the theory of property rights, of finance and of agency to 
develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. Another important study of 
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) researched managerial ownership of US 
firms. Schneper and Guillen (2004) researched the effects of shareholder power in 37 
countries. Markarian (2007) examined changes in governance practices at 75 large 
global firms. 
The differences categorized countries into two groups: insider and outsider systems. 
To understand why a system is characterized as an outsider or insider model, a 
definition of both terms is necessary. 
In the insider (“stakeholder”) model ownership and control are held by insiders who 
have longer-term stable relationships with the company. Banks can play an important 
role. In the firms the owners are inclined to have a stable interest and they usually have 
a position in the board of directors or in other senior managerial institutions. The 
relationships between management and shareholders are close and stable and formal 
rights for employees exist to influence key managerial decisions. This model is 
characteristic of corporate governance in Continental Europe and Asia. 
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The outsider (“shareholder”) model is a common equity ownership with large 
institutional holdings. Market regulation has a precedent position and the firms’ owners 
are inclined to have a preliminary interest in the firm. Close relationships between 
shareholders and management are absent. “Owners of firms tend to have a transitory 
interest in the firm. There exists an active “market for corporate control”. There is a 
primacy of shareholder rights over those of other organizational groups. With well 
regulated and liquid stock market, equities tend to have a high share of financial assets. 
The low debt equity ratio is the norm for the company. Banks provide short term 
finance and maintain arms’ length relationships with corporate clients.” 3 This model is 
characteristic of the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Table 1. Two Types of Financial Systems 
 
 
Source: Markus Berndt: Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems, Discussion Paper No. 
303, 11/2000, p.7. 
 
2.3.3 The Anglo-Saxon System 
 
This model of corporate governance systems is typical in Anglo-Saxon countries and is 
known as the shareholder model. These countries have a low concentration of 
shareholders that happens because many companies are publicly traded and 
shareholders can spread their money over more companies. 
  
                                                 
3
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/46/19802369.ppt 
15 
 
 
2.3.3.1 Ownership Structure 
 
In Anglo-Saxon countries exists a so called diffuse stock ownership which means that 
most of the shares are in the hands of the agents of financial institutions (more than 
50%) rather than private persons (20-30%). These countries have a developed corporate 
governance system and culture therefore they can also have a highly developed stock 
market. 
Shareholders activism can be shown through their proposals and voting results. Figure 5 
shows a graph about the number of filed proposals and the average voting results from 
1997 until 2006. The highest rates have individual investors, but their proposals 
decreased over time. Institutional investors’ proposals increased, which could be 
explained by the increasing rate of institutional ownership from 50 to over 70%. 
 
Figure 5.  Number of filed proposals and average voting results over time 
 
 
Source: Bauer, Rob; Braun, Robin; Viehs, Michael, Industry Competition, Ownership Structure and 
Shareholder Activism, 2010, p.15. 
 
2.3.3.2 Outside Control Mechanism 
 
Maug (1998) analyzed whether liquid stock markets are beneficial for corporate governance. 
If shareholders get adverse information about a company, they can discharge their 
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investments according to the market’s liquidity. The author finds that the liquidity of the 
market assists corporate governance effectiveness. 
Renneboog (1996) argues that if voting power is dispersed, free-riding will occur. 
Single shareholders have benefit only from the percentage of his stake in the firm while 
he will bear the costs of control. Shareholders do not take actions because there is less 
benefit than the control costs. Management will have dominant power in the firm. Great 
power is delegated to management which leads to a short-term orientation. This is 
characteristic of corporate governance. At least once a year management must report to 
the shareholders. This stimulates managers to make decisions that are very profitable in 
the short term. 
 
2.3.3.3 The Role of Government in the U.S. 
 
The economy has been drifting for at least the last two decades toward the wealth-
driven stage. Positions in many advanced industries have eroded. Goals of firms and 
investors have turned away from sustained investment. Competition has slackened. The 
gap in standard of living between the highly educated and skilled employees and those 
with less training is becoming more apparent. Companies are turning to government for 
help in suspending competitive pressures that create appetites for more help. The 
orientation has turned from offensive to defensive. 
The recent improvements in productivity growth and exports, while encouraging, are 
not yet a sign of fundamental change. Productivity growth reflects in no small part a 
one-shot restructuring and downsizing in many industries, and recent figures show that 
the period of growth above historical norms may be short-lived. Net investment still 
lags behind other nations despite the fact that industry is operating at near capacity. 
Export growth reflects a sharp devaluation of the dollar and real wage declines, both of 
which reduce the long-run standard of living. The bases of renewed sustained 
productivity growth are still not in place. There are many areas of underlying advantage 
in the United States, such as top universities, unique demand conditions in some fields, 
the capacity for risk taking, and vibrant new business formation. There are also 
demographic forces which will create pressures for rising productivity growth and a 
higher rate of savings. The rapid pace of change in technology promises to provide 
many opportunities for American inventiveness and entrepreneurship. These create the 
potential for the United States to enter a period of sustained prosperity. At the same 
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time, however, the erosion of U.S. position over the last two decades signals some 
strong constraints to further advancement. 
American firms and the American government have important choices to make. The 
nation is teetering between a renewed commitment to traditional American values and a 
retreat to consolidation, protection, and defensiveness. 
Government policy in the United States reflected a nation with strong and growing 
national advantage. The extent of direct intervention in industry was among the lowest 
in the world. Public ownership was rare, in contrast to a more socialist orientation that 
especially characterized Europe. 
Instead, the American government played a number of indirect roles in industry. One 
was that of factor creator. Investments in education, science, and infrastructure were 
heavy and continuous, and involved state and local governments as well as the federal 
government. Another important government role was as protector of competition. 
America maintained a vigorous antitrust policy, championed a free and open trading 
system, and took important steps to reduce cartelization and economic concentration 
abroad, especially in Germany and Japan. 
The American government also set out aggressively and in some cases earlier than other 
nations to meet a series of challenges and in the process created important indirect 
benefits for industry. The U.S. government also sought to promote and defend 
American interests and democracy abroad. These roles, which would take on greater 
significance as the decades passed, would come to override the needs of industry. 
Finally, a large defense program was instrumental in promoting science and in creating 
advanced home demand. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, defense research centered on 
core technologies such as electronics, computers, and aerospace. Commercial spin-offs 
were numerous and rapid. With a huge technological lead in fields serving defense and 
aerospace markets, U.S. companies often exploited their knowledge and experience to 
establish leading positions in civilian markets. 
It may be most notable; however, that explicit American government attention to 
industry was modest. While government policy yielded benefits that flowed to industry, 
these were rarely the primary motivating force. Instead, American economic strength 
was used to advance other goals. 
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2.3.3.4 Corporate Governance Codes in the U.S. in the Last Decade 
 
The following Corporate Governance Codes were published and actualized in the last 
10 years: Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism 
(2001), Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis & Recommendations (2002), 
Core Policies, General Principles, Positions & Explanatory Notes (2002), Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2002), Corporate Governance Rule Proposals (2002), 
Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise Findings and Recommendations: 
Part 2: Corporate Governance (2003), Restoring Trust - The Breeden Report on 
Corporate Governance for the future of MCI, Inc. (2003), Final NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules (2003), Asset Manager Code of Professional Conduct (2004), TIAA-
CREF Policy Statement on Corporate Governance (2007), Key Agreed Principles to 
Strengthen Corporate Governance for U.S. Publicly Traded Companies (2008), Report 
of the New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance (2010) 
 
2.3.3.5 The Role of Government in Britain 
 
 
Britain has been caught in the wealth-driven stage for some times. Its relative living 
standards have suffered accordingly, particularly for the average worker. The loss of 
competitive advantage created its own momentum. One industry’s weakness spread to 
others. Falling income eroded demand quality. Pressure on government revenues led to 
underinvestment in factor creation, infrastructure, and public services, undermining 
competitive advantage further. This momentum, once created, is hard to arrest. 
There are some signs of renewal in British competitive advantage. Positions in 
chemicals, oil, pharmaceuticals, software, publishing, financial services, and consumer 
goods are being sustained. Along with these is growing strength in retailing and signs of 
a rebound in manufacturing companies. Productivity growth and investment have 
improved. 
An important catalyst for change has undeniably been the Thatcher government. Other 
forces are also at work in Britain which has helped. Economic necessity, changing 
social norms, and the takeover and turnaround of stodgy companies have also 
contributed to the new wave of energy sweeping across many British firms and 
industries. 
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However, the renewal of British industries appears fragile and spotty. A large pool of 
unemployed persists. Renewal is also confined, in many industries, to one-shot 
restructuring and cost cutting, made possible in some cases by a new balance of power 
between unions and management. Mergers are prevalent, but the benefits to real 
competitive advantage are less clear. Especially in manufacturing, British firms have 
undone some past sins, but most have yet to create the basis for future advantage. This 
requires new products and new processes; it requires innovation. 
A good deal of the growth in British employment has come from investments by foreign 
firms. Much of this, however, is driven by factor costs. Foreign investments are largely 
in assembly facilities taking advantage of low-wage, mostly unskilled labor. While 
foreign investment provides some welcomed benefits to British industry, and economy 
whose growth depends on assembly outposts of foreign companies will be constrained 
in terms of productivity growth. 
 
2.3.3.6 Corporate Governance Codes in Britain in the Last Decade 
 
The following Corporate Governance Codes were published and actualized in the last 
10 years: Code of Good Practice January (2001), Review of the role and effectiveness 
of non-executive directors (Consultation Paper) (2002), The Hermes Principles (2002), 
The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents - Statement of Principles 
(2002), The Higgs Report: Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors (2003), Audit Committees - Combined Code Guidance (the Smith Report) 
(2003), The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003), Corporate Governance: 
A Practical Guide (2004), Good Governance: The Code of Governance for the 
Voluntary and Community Sector (2005), Pension Scheme Governance - fit for the 21st 
century: A Discussion Paper from the NAPF (2005), Corporate governance in central 
government departments: Code of good practice (2005), Internal Control: Revised 
Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (2005), Good practice suggestions from 
the Higgs Report (2006), The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2006), 
Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity (2007), The Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance (Revised June 2008), A review of corporate governance 
in UK banks and other financial industry entities (The Walker Review) (2009), A 
review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: Final 
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recommendations (The Walker Review) (2009), 2009 Review of the Combined Code: 
Final Report (2009), The Audit Firm Governance Code (2010), A Stewardship Code for 
Institutional Investors (2010), The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), The UK 
Stewardship Code (2010), The AIC Code of Corporate Governance (2010), Corporate 
Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in the UK (2010) 
 
 
2.3.4 The Germanic System 
 
In Germany is the concentration of ownership very high. The owners are financial 
intermediaries who are much appreciated. The votes of banks can be given to the 
shareholders, which in turn can be deposited in there banks. This is the so called proxy 
voting system. This is the reason why banks can be able to have a big part of control 
even over bigger companies. Most important cross-holdings are – regarding even 
financial and non-financial firms – the insurance companies and banks. The importance 
of portfolio-investors is marginal (e.g. pension funds, investment funds) which is shown 
in the importance of consequence of cross-holdings’ scope and the role of banks. In 
German firms the management board is not elected by the shareholders but by the 
supervisory board. There exists also an assumption that the former is elected and 
controlled by the supervisory board. In the Germanic system the stock exchange plays a 
less important role. The number of listed companies and their market capitalization is 
small compared to the size of German economy. Only a few companies have shares 
with high turnover. 
In German countries only a small proportion of the total numbers of firms is listed. A 
high percentage of the total number of shares that are publicly traded is held by 
shareholders. Private persons hold 15-35%, financial institutions 10-30% and private 
companies 20-40% of the shares. Private persons and companies act directly and do not 
use agents to manage their affairs. 
There are not many shareholders who have a high percentage of a company’s shares and 
therefore they control the firm and make decisions. 
It is typical of this model that a few shareholders have a considerable power, and 
therefore they keep control over the company. The consequence is that their goal is not 
to enlarge the size of the company but to increase profitability. The ownership structure 
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of many firms is characterized by the participation of control and holding structures. A 
few owners are suppliers of the company’s equity, since ownership is concentrated. 
They have the power over the investments, although the control’s complex structure 
dispute transparency to the firm’s structure. Because ownership is concentrated, only a 
few owners are suppliers of the equity to the firm. The transfer of cash flow from one 
company to another is a common practice. According to the absence of transparency, 
cash flow can be transferred from firms with good performance to similar but bad 
performing firms. 
To enhance the performance of corporate governance model, internal discipline 
mechanisms are frequently used in the Germanic model and are introduced from inside 
the company itself. They include the board of directors, compensation contracts and 
discharge of the management function. 
The Germanic system of financial investment and corporate governance is based on 
banks. 
This structure is said to lead to considerable benefits, especially in two respects: the 
availability of cheaper and longer-term bank finance for firms, and better corporate 
governance in terms of fewer agency problems. 
Usually the advantages claimed for a bank-oriented system are derived from the number 
and nature of close links between a universal bank as financier and its client firm. 
German banks are seen as being much more closely involved with the firms they supply 
funds to than banks are in market-oriented systems. 
Only a small number of banks act as monitors of management on behalf of shareholders 
in a small number of firms. For all other firms, there is an even greater lack of data and 
thorough studies on the extent to which German banks play a role in corporate 
governance that differs markedly from the monitoring role of credit institutions in other 
countries.  
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Figure 5. The building blocks of the German model of corporate governance 
 
   
Source: Dariusz Wójcik: Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from 
Blockholdings, 1997-2001, Fig.1. 
 
 
2.3.4.1 Corporate Landscape 
 
80% of the firms belong to the so called „Mittelstand”. “German stock corporations 
(Aktiengesellschaften) have three corporate bodies – an annual general meeting of 
shareholders, a board of management (Vorstand) and a supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat). At the annual general meeting, shareholders exercise the rights granted 
to them by the Stock Corporation Act. These include in particular the resolution on the 
appropriation of net retained profits, the election of the auditor, the discharge of the 
board of management and the supervisory board, amendments to the Articles of 
Incorporation, the issue of new stock and convertible bonds and bonds with warrants, 
the authorization to acquire own stock and the election of the shareholders’ 
representatives to the supervisory board.” 4 
  
                                                 
4
 http://www.sglgroup.com/cms/international/investor-relations/corporate-governance/principles-of-german-
corporate-governance/index.html?__locale=en 
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2.3.4.2 Codetermination 
 
“German corporate governance practices are generally based on the provisions of the 
German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), the German Codetermination Act 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz) and the German Corporate Governance Code.” 5 
 
2.3.4.3 Insider-based System 
 
The German insider-based system is characterized by the high ownership concentration. 
Banks are often major owners and cross-ownership networks are common. Hostile take-
overs are rarely to find. 
 
2.3.4.4 Governing Bodies 
 
• Hauptversammlung 
Hauptversammlung is a kind of a general business meeting which takes place 1-2 times 
in a year. Shareholders can vote with special stocks. 
• Aufsichtsrat 
Supervisory board is called Aufsichtsrat in the German system. It controls the Vorstand 
whose members are elected for 4-year tenure. Aufsichtsrat has non-executive members 
(from banks etc) and employees and also committees. The supervisory board in the 
Germanic system consists of shareholders’ and employees’ representatives. Generally, 
the shareholders who are members of the supervisory board are experts in business 
activities of the firm. 
• Vorstand 
The board of management consists of executive directors who are elected for 5-year 
tenure. The Sprecher (=speaker) is equal among equals. The members get a 
remuneration which is a fixed salary plus profit share. They are responsible for 
representing the company in its dealings with third parties and managing it. The 
activities and functions of senior executives in U.S firms are similar to those of German 
board of management. Hence, the speaker and the chairman and also the whole stock 
                                                 
5
 http://www.sglgroup.com/cms/international/investor-relations/corporate-governance/principles-of-german-
corporate-governance/index.html?__locale=en 
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corporation are considered as equals. They together disperse responsibility regarding 
management decisions. 
2.3.4.5 Changes in the Last Decades 
 
There is a considerable stability in the German corporate governance system regarding 
the last 30 years, but ignoring the last 10 years. In the European context hardly any 
other country exhibits so much stability in this area. The role of banks has marginal 
changed, and the co-determination has been kept stable. The joint stock corporation’s 
legal structure is almost untouched. To define it more general, the conflict’s and 
collaboration’s consistence between different groups, which are relevant in German 
corporate governance, has remained the same over the last decades. There has also been 
no change in the fact that small shareholders’ interests tend to receive relatively little 
attention. 
The change happened not only because the previous system was not at all bad for all 
parties and the members have realized the signs. A specific effect of preservation and 
consistency on a system’s affinity exists which helps to develop and adapt to new 
circumstances. Complementarity and consistency prevent changes, especially gradual 
changes. Reforms typically start as partial reforms. As long as there is not an extreme 
problem, reforms are not ‘revolutions’. 
The potentially most important recent developments have taken place in the political 
area. 
Recently the German system of corporate governance is going ahead towards the 
Anglo-Saxon model. It was previously known for cross-holdings and concentrated 
ownership. Now there are different forms of concentrated ownership by the state, other 
corporations and families. And there are also companies which are widely held. 
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Table 2.Companies by largest owner 
 
Source: Fronningen, Leif Anders; van der Wijst, Nico, Ownership structure and performance of the 
largest German companies, Working Paper Series, 2009, p.8. 
 
Table 2 shows companies with largest owners in %. Ownership structures have changed 
within 15 years.  
 
2.3.4.6 Corporate Governance Codes in the Last Decade 
 
In the last 10 years there were 10 different corporate governance codes and their 
actualized versions published. The most important ones are the Baums Commission 
Report (2001), The German Corporate Governance Code (The Cromme Code, 2002), 
which was six times actualized and supplemented (the last one was published in 2010) 
and The Corporate Governance Code for Asset Management Companies (2005). 
 
2.3.4.7 The Role of Government in Germany 
 
Comparing the German government with other Asian and European countries, it has a 
rather moderate participation in the industrial policy. Germany is among the most open 
markets in the world, and tariffs have historically been low. German industry has had to 
face foreign competition and has been strengthened in the process. Export financing is 
done on a commercial basis, not through a government agency that is subsidized.  
The principal role of the German government, both federal and Länder, has been in 
factor creation, especially in education and in science and technology. The extensive 
array of mechanisms described earlier is heavily funded by government. Interestingly, 
though, direct government control is not exercised in many instances; a degree of 
independence is present even in government-funded technical institutes. 
26 
 
German regulation has tended to be demanding and has generally pressured innovation, 
not impeded it. German environmental standards are also stringent and lead the world in 
some fields, stimulating innovation in the industries affected. Yet German regulation 
has frozen the status quo in other areas. 
Despite its generally constructive role, the German government has also had a 
stubbornly persistent tendency to subsidize ailing sectors such as steel and shipbuilding, 
with little effect except to postpone adjustment. Deregulation has lagged behind many 
other nations, placing a drag on the advancement of the affected industries. The extent 
of state ownership in Germany is relatively high; privatization and the opening of 
industries to competition have also lagged. Moreover, the commitment to competition 
has seemed increasingly tentative. Finally, the tax changes I described earlier raise 
serious concerns for corporate goals, as well as, in the long term, for new business 
formation. 
Summarizing the facts about the German corporate governance system, it can be said 
that Germany became an industrial powerhouse in the late nineteenth century when it 
achieved world-class status in science and technology. It has been an innovation-driven 
economy even since. The enormous breadth of industries in which Germany has 
competitive advantage has made the German economy a robust one in international 
competition. German companies usually compete on the basis of differentiation instead 
of cost. They enjoy early mover advantages due to an installed base of sales, well-
developed foreign sales and service networks, and an international manufacturing 
presence in many industries. The dynamism of German industry has been continually 
stimulated by a rapid rate of factor creation, selective factor disadvantages, and 
demand-side pressures. 
Yet there are some real threats to German dynamism. Germany has enjoyed more than 
three decades of uninterrupted prosperity and is among the highest standards of living in 
the world. While the breadth of German industry is substantial, and positions in most 
established German industries have been sustained, many more industries are losing 
world share than gaining it. The creation of new businesses in Germany is inadequate to 
deal with a stubbornly high unemployment rate. Major commercial and scientific 
breakthroughs by German firms have become rarer. Germany is at the cutting edge of 
few new consumer product or service industries. 
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2.3.5 Japanese System 
 
2.3.5.1 Past Features of Japanese Companies 
 
The Japanese model is a combination of focusing on employees and on shareholders. 
This illustrates that it is not typical of Anglo-American corporate governance giving top 
priority to the interests of shareholders. 
The Japanese corporate governance has two basic characteristic properties. The first 
property is that the main bank plays an important role in disciplining and monitoring the 
client firm. Shareholders are expected to discipline firms in equity funding. But equity 
funding has had only restricted role in corporate governance, because shares have been 
extensively cross-held between corporations and banks or between non-bank 
corporations. These properties have substantial limiting factors for corporate 
governance in Japan. 
Past features of corporate governance in Japan are the system of support by main bank, 
the stabilization of shareholders by cross-holdings with other companies, and the 
running of board of directors and board of auditors by persons promoted from inside 
company. A firm would have a long-term business relationship with a specific bank by 
cross-holdings of shares, loans, etc. Close monitoring by the firm’s bank, gathering 
detailed information which are not otherwise available on firm performance and plans 
are involved. If a company falls into financial threat, the main bank has to rescue and 
restructure it. 
Most companies however have now shifted from bank financing to market-oriented 
financing. As a result, ties with banks have become weaker than in the past. This main 
bank-oriented mode of corporate governance is low in transparency. 
The most of the auditors and directors were drawn from the ranks of employees. The 
number of “silent shareholders” was increased by the extensive cross-holdings. This led 
to imperfect operation of the monitoring function of the capital market. 
2.3.5.2 Changes in the Capital Market 
 
As a result of liberalization and growth of the direct financing market starting in the 
1980s, the means of raising capital in Japan have been diversified. Large companies in 
particular have shifted from indirect financing to direct financing. As a result, corporate 
governance by main banks has become weaker. 
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The asset structure of companies and financial institutions have been re-evaluated and 
also other improvements in the management’s reforms were made. These were 
motivated by the Japanese capital market’s reforms to support the initiation of mark to 
market accounting and direct financing and also other changes in the accounting system. 
The reforms of financial system under which this happened were launched by the 
government in November 1996. Accordingly, cross-holdings have been rapidly 
disintegrated. 
Companies have to become more oriented toward running their businesses with an eye 
to share prices and shareholders in order to win the trust of shareholders and have to put 
more emphasis on investor relations from the viewpoint of facilitating capital 
procurement. Further, they can utilize means such as cancellation of their own stock 
through capital reserves in order to directly influence the market. 
 
2.3.5.3 The Main Bank 
 
“The term ’main bank system’ refers to a system of corporate financing and governance 
involving an informal set of practices, institutional arrangements, and behaviors among 
industrial and commercial firms, banks of various types, other financial institutions, and 
the regulatory authorities.” 
Some important institutional shareholders have the direct control in Japan, supported by 
stable and concentrated shareholding. The ‘main bank’ plays an important role in 
corporate governance among them. Although a company usually does business with 
several banks, it often has a special relationship with one of them. This main bank 
performs five important functions: it makes loans, and is usually its major creditor; it 
helps place the bonds issued by the firm; it owns shares, often, indeed, as the main 
shareholder; it offers payment settlement facilities; and it supplies information and 
management personnel. 
These functions enable the bank to integrate three types of monitoring: ex-ante – 
basically, screening the company’s applications for loans; interim – gathering 
information on the continuing performance of borrowers; and ex post – intervening in 
the affairs of firms in difficulties. It is not completely clear why banks have the 
motivation to carry out such a comprehensive monitoring on behalf of other 
shareholders and bank lenders. It seems to have resulted in a number of advantages for 
other financial institutions. 
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One of the most important characteristics of the Japanese main-bank system is that it 
supplies rather contingent governance. If efficiency is good, corporate deals can be 
managed by the governing management.  When it deteriorates, the main bank, using its 
power as a lender and shareholder, intervenes in the management of companies to 
supervise downsizing and reorganization where necessary. 
Such interventions often occur through the appointment of bank directors to the board 
of the company. Basic evidence is that the directorial influence of banks on client firms’ 
board is much stronger than needed. This is also a sign for the importance of the main 
bank. 
Moreover, the probability that a bank will send additional directors to a board is directly 
related to poor performance, particularly in comparison with other companies in the 
same industry. Other large shareholders also exercise an important but subsidiary 
influence. In addition, business partners, such as suppliers and clients, also monitor the 
performance of companies. 
The main bank system functions as follows: the firm borrows or has equity owned by 
many banks, but the main financier is delegated responsibility for monitoring the firm. 
The bank and its main client firms reciprocally own equities, although there is a limit 
imposed on the bank’s ownership, and proxy voting by the bank is not permitted. 
Corporate holdings in the banks are so dispersed that the banks are, in effect, 
managerially autonomous. In normal times, bank intervention in corporate governance 
is limited. However, corporate failure triggers a take-over mechanism that sees control 
rights shift to the bank. The ex post monitoring function is exclusively delegated to the 
main bank, which gives it incentives to engage in ex ante and interim monitoring more 
intensively than other financial institutions. If the main bank tries to shirk its 
responsibilities ex post, sanctions may be imposed by the regulatory authorities. 
 
2.3.5.4 Characteristics of the Japanese Finance 
 
A country’s financial system is not only shown by its supply and demand situation but 
also by social, cultural and historical facts.  
In the case of Japan, the heavy reliance on debt financing, rather than equity financing, 
is characterized by heavy bank-borrowing under the main bank system, a form of close 
and continuous bank-firm relationship. 
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Japan, like other countries, has a private enterprise, private ownership, market economy. 
It also has its own specific features of capitalism. One important feature of the Japanese 
economy is that many markets are not impersonal. They are moderated by relationships 
among market participants founded upon the building and maintenance of trust through 
repeated transactions and honorable handling of unanticipated situations. Relationships 
are reflected in labor markets, subcontracting, buyers and suppliers, brand loyalty, and 
in banking, as well as other financial services. 
 
2.3.5.5 Auditing Management 
 
In most cases internal employees are promoted to the positions of auditors. This leads to 
an inability to prevent improper actions. The number of directors is large (average 20 to 
40). This leads to an inability to debate management policies of companies. Almost all 
directors come from inside the companies and are unwilling to openly voice opposition 
to decisions of the top management. 
The American style management system of dividing responsibilities between executive 
officers concentrating on the actual running of the business and directors supervising 
them and deciding on business policies from an overall company perspective is 
increasingly being adopted in Japan as well. 
 
 
Figure 6.Auditing Management 
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2.3.5.6 The Role of Government in Japan 
 
The Japanese government has played a rapidly changing and often subtle role in the 
industries in which Japan has achieved national competitive advantage. After World 
War II, its role was relatively heavy-handed. It directed the flow of capital and scarce 
resources (such as steel) into particular sectors, limited foreign entry, negotiated 
licenses of foreign technology, held down exchange rates, and provided various kinds of 
assistance in exporting. 
At the time of early Japanese successes like steel, shipbuilding and sewing machines, 
this type of governing was constructive. Price was an important position in those 
sections where Japanese firms were competing. Many of the industries were capital 
intensive. Competitive advantage depended on modern and great opportunities. 
Government’s leverages were powerful at this stage. Important Japanese industries were 
able to move beyond reliance on basic factor costs. 
In these early successes, government was not working in isolation. Japan also had 
advantages in other determinants such as demand conditions or related and supporting 
industries that contributed to success, along with vigorous domestic competition. It is 
also important to realize that in other great and appreciable industries where Japan has 
not get any advantages for the industry the government’s aggressive efforts were useless 
to get international competitors. 
The Japanese success story is built on dynamism. Japanese firms have been pressured 
into rapid and continual innovation that has often anticipated world market needs. 
Companies have relentlessly upgraded their competitive advantages rather than resting 
on them. The Japanese economy has formed competitive clusters and upgraded its mix 
of industries. 
The high rate of capital investment, rapid productivity growth, and rapidly rising 
income per capita are some of the many overall indicators that the process of upgrading 
is occurring. 
Summarizing the facts about Japanese corporate governance system I can say that Japan 
has made a remarkable transition from the factor-driven to the innovation-driven stage 
in the post-war period. Its companies have evolved from competing on price to 
competing on advanced products and processes. Japan illustrates the process of 
upgrading industry as no other nation does. The system of determinants in Japan is 
enjoying the positive reinforcement effects of the “diamond”, as one competitive 
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industry begets another and demand conditions upgrade. Momentum is widening the 
base of successful industries. 
The recent appreciation of the yen has prompted even further upgrading of the sources 
of competitive advantage in Japanese industry. More and more companies are 
competing on differentiation, advanced product technology, and improved productivity. 
Personal incomes in Japan are rising. Domestic demand for many goods has also been 
limited by housing conditions and little leisure time. Working hours are already falling 
in major Japanese companies with the encouragement of government, and this change 
will fuel substantial growth in leisure-related industries. Growth in the number of 
second homes, coupled with a boom in remodeling existing homes and apartments will 
create new demand for furnishings and household products. 
Given such a positive foundation, the continued health of the Japanese economy in the 
medium term is not in doubt. The most pressing immediate challenge for Japan is 
dealing with the large portion of the economy that is unproductive and has fallen 
outside the Japanese miracle and holds back national productivity. In the long run, the 
challenge for a nation like Japan is even more fundamental – how to retain dynamism 
and avoid a drift toward a wealth-driven economy. As profits accumulate, debt is 
repaid, and the pool of wealth grows, forces are set in motions which produce 
consequences that are seen in the economic histories of nations such as Germany, the 
United States, and Britain. The rate of productivity growth overall and in manufacturing 
has already slowed markedly in the Japanese economy. 
2.3.5.7 Corporate Governance Codes in the Last Decade 
 
The following corporate governance codes were published in the last 10 years: Revised 
Corporate Governance Principles (2001), Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies (2004), Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (2009) 
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Table 3.The importance of different corporate control mechanisms in large non-
financial firms in four economies 
 
Mechanism United States United 
Kingdom 
Japan Germany 
Board 
independence / 
power over 
management 
Little Little Little formally, 
more influence 
informally via 
President’s 
Club meetings 
Greatest 
Importance of 
pay / 
performance 
relationship in 
top 
management 
compensation 
package 
Small Unknown, 
probably small 
Less Important for 
those firms that 
are owner-
managed 
Monitoring by 
financial 
institutions 
shareholders 
Little Little Substantial Some 
Monitoring by 
non-financial 
firm 
shareholders 
Little Little Some Substantial 
Monitoring by 
individual 
shareholders 
Little Little Little Important for 
those firms that 
are owner-
managed 
Frequency of 
hostile 
takeovers 
Frequent Frequent Virtually non-
existent 
Virtually non-
existent 
Source: Jian Chen, Corporate Governance in China, 2005 p.21 
 
2.3.6 Latin Countries – Example: Spain 
 
Corporate governance is here in a wider sense defined that it contains the institutional 
environment where the firm’s decisions are laid down (e.g. legal, financial system, 
market for corporate control and the stock exchange); in addition its main direction 
contains the government characteristics like the type of ownership and concentration.  
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2.3.6.1 The Legal Regulation of Corporate Governance 
 
Commercial law protected originally larger shareholders and left a closer space for 
small shareholders. 
Like other Latin countries, Spain is a typical case of a country with weak anti-director 
rights, weak protection of minority investors, and concentrated ownership (La Porta et 
al. 1998). These features were accompanied by poor accountability and a lack of 
transparency. Spanish financial system’s main reform contains two enactments to 
improve the protection of shareholders’ rights. 
 
2.3.6.2 The Financial System 
 
In the past the Spanish financial system showed some similarities to the German 
system. Main sources of financial capital were industrial banks with strong cross-
holdings and director-interlocks between banks and industry. Nowadays Spanish 
financial system experienced a lot of changes. This fact encourages investors. To 
demonstrate this I am going to list some institutions of Spanish financial system: 
banking system, institutional investments, stock exchange, risk capital and some 
characteristics of corporate control.  
Spanish banking system, especially industrial banks played a privileged and protected 
role in Spanish economy. This changed when the competition disposed the sector to 
open the market. By 1998 Spanish banking system experienced remarkable 
consolidation through the privatization of the most state-owned banks and the fusion of 
the biggest 6 banks into two. The role of the banks in the Spanish economy is reflected 
by the corporate financing. 
The existence of institutional investors (insurance companies, investment companies, 
pension funds and other forms of institutional saving funds) at the Spanish financial 
market in the early 90’s was rather small compared with other OECD countries. By the 
end of the 90’s multiplied the rate of institutional investors by three in the Spanish 
financial system, and reached the level of other Continental European countries. The 
importance of institutional investments can be explained through the existence of 
foreign capital, the growth of holding companies, support of state pensions by private 
pension funds and the financial deficit’s transfer into household-savings. 
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Spanish stock exchange was small, underdeveloped and geographically segmented into 
four parts. In the 90’s the stock exchange experienced the following processes: market 
capitalization, securization, and the modernization of administrative procedures. In the 
last few years the market capitalization and the number of firms at the Spanish stock 
exchange have grown, but they are still under those of Anglo-Saxon countries. We can 
say that there is a trend toward the Anglo-Saxon system. 
Compared with other OECD countries the venture capital investments in Spain are 
underdeveloped. This fact can cause long-term effects. There is practically no market 
for corporate control between Spanish companies because of the registered firms’ high 
ownership concentration and the minority shareholders’ rights.  
 
2.3.6.3 Ownership Structure 
 
In Spain, the owner’s identity and their shareholdings are yearly reported by the Banco 
de España. By the early 2000’s 45% of Spanish firms were owned by domestic capital 
(domestic firms, private persons, state). 
Firms listed at the Spanish stock exchange have another type of ownership structure 
than other Continental European firms, especially because of the consolidation of the 
stock exchange in the 90’s. In 1996 investors of foreign institutions were the main 
shareholders, ahead of private persons and families.  
Spanish firms try to come up with more developed countries by establishing new 
institutions together with the legislation and establish inactive ones like the stock 
exchange. Other characteristics of Latin government systems remain like the leading 
role of banks and ownership concentration. 
 
2.3.6.4 Changes in Corporate Governance 
 
Spain was traditionally characterized by high state ownership, strong state intervention, 
and an important role for banks. The country had a special own road from which a new 
governance has grown with own traditions. 
It has adopted practices from different countries, but in particular from the Anglo-Saxon 
model. 
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Present Spanish corporate governance has the following characteristics: new role of the 
state as regulator, newly privatized firms are in the hands of core investors (many of the 
are foreign investors), higher free capital flow at the stock exchange, but small own 
capital market, weak market for corporate control, growing transparency because of the 
introduction of Anglo-Saxon practices, accountability and preferably more efficient 
board. Spain has a strong bipolar labor market economy, with safer and better paid jobs 
in bigger firms, multinational companies, and state-owned organizations. Recently 
further changes lead often to layoffs because of the growing pressure of corporate 
governance. They also require more flexible working and also payments became more 
unstable. 
 
2.3.6.5 Corporate Governance Codes in the Last Decade 
 
The following corporate governance codes were published in the last ten years: The 
Aldama report (2003), Decálogo del Directivo (2004), IC-A: Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance (2004), IC-A: Principles of Good Corporate Governance for 
Unlisted Companies (2005), Draft Unified Code of Recommendations for the Good 
Governance (2006), IC-A: Code of Ethics for Companies (2006), Unified Good 
Governance Code (2006). 
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3 Are These Systems Converging? 
 
3.1 Dimensions of Corporate Governance 
 
The board, the managers and the stockholders have a vertical and a horizontal 
dimension. The horizontal dimension is between dominant stockholders and dispersed 
stockholders. The horizontal focus is on preventing or minimizing the shifts in value 
from dispersed outsiders to controlling inside stockholders. That dimension of inquiry is 
paler in the United States than it is in Europe. Lacking a single shareholder-controller, 
the typical American firm has fewer horizontal problems, but more vertical problems.  
 
3.2 Changes in the Corporate Governance Systems in the Last Decades 
 
In the last decades signs of changes can be experienced in the structure of corporate 
governance systems on many fields. 
Managers should act in the interest of shareholders including minority or even 
controlling. There are three factors which drive toward convergence: 
• The competitive pressure of global commerce 
• The failure of alternative models  
• Shift of interest group influence in favor of an emerging shareholder class 
An important fact is that change of law is also necessary for further convergence.  
But there are also other reasons why corporate governance is currently such a prominent 
issue. 
- World-wide privatization in the last three decades: it was an important 
phenomenon in Latin America, Western Europe, and Asia and in the former 
Soviet block (but not in the United States). 
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Table 4. Privatization Revenues by Region 1977-97 
 
 
Source: Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2000) 
Note: PO-Public Offerings; PS-Privat Sales 
 
Privatization wave caused also problems in corporate governance. It was not 
clear how newly founded corporations should be owned and controlled. Shinn 
(2001) said that the state’s new role as a public shareholder in privatized 
corporations has been an important source of impetus for changes in corporate 
governance practices worldwide.  
- Pension funds and active investors: household savings through mutual and 
pension funds became more important. This fact influences corporate 
governance. 
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Table 5. Financial Assets of Institutional Investors in OECD Countries 
 
 
Source: Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control, 2005 (Finance 
Working Paper No 02/2002), Table 1 
 
 
- Mergers and takeovers: there was a hostile takeover wave in the USA in the 
1980s and in Europe in the 1990s which caused public debate on corporate 
governance. 
- Deregulation and capital market integration: there are rules to protect and 
encourage foreign investment in Eastern Europe, Asia and other emerging 
markets. Main goal is to integrate world capital markets and the growth in 
equity capital. 
- The 1998 Russia / East Asia / Brazil crisis occurred because of the weak 
corporate practices 
- There were scandals and failures at major USA corporations 
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3.3 Why is there Convergence at all? 
 
The investment and trade liberalization lead to the pressure on companies to assimilate. 
Globally provided products are in competition with domestic products in price and 
quality. This fact leads to convergence of cost structures and firm organization which 
has an effect on decision making and behavior. 
International labels globalize customers’ taste and choices. Convergence is the effect of 
globalization in capital market. 
Many global providers of market finance use global uniform standards. These key 
requirements should be satisfied everywhere. Another important fact is that these 
requirements leave a free space for differences among countries. 
The 2002 Investor Opinion Survey by McKinsey found that institutional investors said 
they would pay very high premium for well governed corporations. 
Crédit Lyonnaise (CLSA) reported 2001 and 2002 that corporate governance is 
correlated to stock valuations and financial performance. 
Financial markets have shown that globalization leads to the change of long-established 
domestic patterns of finance. 
3.4 Convergence toward what? 
 
Convergence is perhaps meant as a victory of one system above the others. But fact is 
that management, governance and business plans are closely integrated in most 
companies. 
The main task of globalization should be to minimize the risk between investors and 
investees. 
Because of the importance of Anglo-Saxon institutions the practices and norms are 
benchmark for the reforms. The high quality is more and more important for the 
reformers. In some respects, the Anglo-Saxon system is already closer to the 
Continental European. 
There are three main areas of convergence: 
• Normative background: the hardening of norms is a very important step 
toward convergence. The principles of the OECD, ICGN, IIF lead to 
convergence around the world. The Anglo-American regulatory system is 
changing towards the European (the senior corporate officers have to 
certify the fairness of corporate accounts; corporate executives and 
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directors should face criminal sanctions if they are found to have deceived 
shareholders; prohibition on company lending to senior executives). Since 
the listings on stock exchanges in the U.S. have been revised in recent time, 
also European companies can be listed on American Stock Exchanges. The 
NYSE rules are benchmark for listing requirements. 
“Notwithstanding legal differences among EU member States, the trends 
toward convergence in corporate governance practices in EU member 
states appear to be both numerous and more powerful than any trends 
toward differentiation. In this regard, the codes – together with market 
pressures – appear to serve as a converging force, by focusing attention 
and discussion on governance issues, articulating best practice 
recommendations and encouraging companies to adopt them.”6 
Divergence is generated in the EU by legal provisions and mandatory 
requirements. Market-based incentives would be better for the governance 
in many European countries. 
• Board independence and structure: there are more independent boards. The 
role of the audit committee and convergence with two-tier board increases. 
The tendency is to arise the board’s independence which can happen 
through the “significant” number of non-executive independent directors. 
In the US this number is the half of the board’s seats. These independent 
directors are not the only solution to show the independence in the board: 
the board is nominated by the own candidates if shareholders are highly 
dispersed. If the ownership structure is not too fragmented, the best 
solution is if direct shareholders represent on the board. 
Cumulative voting works as follows: 
“Cumulative voting allows minority shareholders to elect their board 
representatives directly. In the more common non-cumulative voting system 
the election of each director is effectuated by majority voting; every voting 
share has one vote. Typically, in cumulative voting, the number of votes 
one shareholder may cast corresponds to the number of his or her voting 
share multiplied by the number of seats on the board. The entire board is 
                                                 
6
 „Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Member States,” 
Weil, Gotschal, and Manges LLP, 2002. Available upon request from Weil, Gotschal and Manges 
(www.weil.com). 
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elected in one round of voting, allowing the minority to concentrate its 
votes on one or two candidates. 
For a cumulative voting system to be implemented successfully, the 
selection of board members should not be staggered (in general, staggered 
boards in which only a few directors come up for re-election in one given 
year present few benefits for shareholders and are often used as a device to 
discourage hostile takeovers). In addition, the nomination process should 
allow appointment of directors who are not approved by management (or 
the incumbent board). 
Cumulative voting is the default method in the U.S. Model Business 
Corporation Act as well as in the corporate law of Delaware and New 
York, where the majority of large U.S. corporations are registered. 
However, only a few U.S. states, including California, have made it a 
mandatory requirement. Russia is the only country to have introduced a 
fully mandatory cumulative voting requirement in its 1996 company law.”7 
There is also convergence in the opposite direction. In Japan for example 
the commercial code was changed in 2002 which allows companies to 
choose their structure of governance (among the old scheme that there is a 
separate audit board and the new scheme which is similar to the U.S. 
system). 
• Accounting and disclosure standards and the regulation of audit: 
Accounting and disclosure standards seem to converge globally, too. There 
are already several standards which are used worldwide. Such standards 
are for example the IAS (International Accounting Standards) or the US 
GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles). Many European firms 
present their accountings according to these principles. In Japan there has 
been a change in accounting standard since 2000. They have been bringing 
their rules closer to IAS. China is also on the way bringing the accounting 
standards closer to those of IAS. 
In the U.S. legislative proposals suggest that U.S. GAAP should move 
toward the IAS. 
                                                 
7
 Stilpon Nestor, LL.M., International Corporate Governance Convergence, page 55, Box 3.1 
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There are already many signs for convergence of different countries. More and more 
Japanese firms are listed for example on NYSE or London Stock Exchange. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is also a step of convergence of American and British firms 
towards the Continental European system. Goal of the 8th EU directive tries to regulate 
the EU states’ corporate governance systems, which is I would say is the “European 
version” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board 
in Anglo-Saxon countries moves this system towards the Continental European two-tier 
system. 
OECD’s Millstein Report argues that fairness, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility help national corporate governance systems reducing specific differences. 
 
3.5  Convergence based on firm performance 
 
I think that ownership structure has a significant impact on the functioning of corporate 
governance system, because owners’ decision-making can be influenced and this has an 
effect on corporate life and governance. 
The choice of an optimal ownership structure is firm specific and endogenous. The 
success of one ownership structure can be hardly compared with an other one because 
of the different circumstances. Generally the measurement of corporate governance 
quality is very difficult. 
One approach which makes easier to find out if ownership structures are converging is 
the arrangement of countries based on their legal systems in two groups. We distinguish 
between common law and code law countries. In common law countries there can be 
many shareholders within a firm and they are also strong protected by law mainly in the 
interest of minority shareholders. Shareholders are more concentrated in code law 
countries; they are not as strong protected as in common law countries. Complex 
ownership arrangements are typical of code law firms. In case of concentrated 
ownership we distinguish between cash-flow rights and voting rights of shares, which 
means, that owning a relatively small proportion of the shares capital can be enough to 
control the firm. 
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In Japanese firms for example controlling shareholders and cross-shareholdings are 
common and have a big influence on corporate governance. There exist business 
groupings (keiretsus) and the main bank acts as shareholder. The main bank also lends 
money to other firms within one keiretsu so it becomes both a shareholder and a debt-
holder. This arrangement can lead to reduction of agency costs. In the board of directors 
there must be one representative of the main bank to avoid information asymmetry 
between firm and bank. Since the main bank plays a very important role within the 
keiretsus, a representative of it can be placed on the board of that firm which acts 
poorly. 
The best measurement of effectiveness of a firm’s functioning is its performance. Now I 
would like to give an overview about the relationship between firm performance and 
some stakeholders. 
3.5.1 Board structure’s influence on firm performance 
 
The independence of directors is one of the most important factors of corporate 
governance. Legal requirements can be easier met by the board and they can also better 
control management’s actions. Furthermore the interest of other stakeholders can be 
more comprehensive protected. If strong monitoring practices are absent outside 
directors can act as they are responsible for monitoring the firm. For those firms whose 
board mainly consists of outside directors a new appointment of an outsider does not 
raise the shareholder value. 
There were many studies which examined the connection between the performance of 
firms with controlling shareholders and the board structure. Dahya (2008) reported 
about a positive relationship and assessed that this effect is stronger in those countries 
where the legal protection of minority shareholders is weaker. The firm value can be 
increased by a dominant shareholder, if an independent board is appointed, especially in 
those countries of weak legal shareholder protection. 
The board structure can be examined also from the view of CEO. If the CEO is also the 
chairperson, we speak about duality. This type of board structure is typical of US 
companies. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that agency costs can be reduced and firm 
performance can be enhanced if CEO and chairperson are separated. The greatest 
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influence has the chairperson over a board’s functioning. This means that decision 
management and decision control should be separated within the firm. Corporate 
governance codes advise in UK that the roles of chairman and CEO should be 
separated. Generally firms choose endogenously their own leadership structure. 
 
3.5.2 Ownership structure’s influence on firm performance 
 
Berle and Means (1932) reported, that managers are not forced to maximize corporate 
efficiency if ownership and control are separated. Jensen and Meckling (1976) think 
that higher insider ownership minimizes agency conflicts. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
argue that a certain degree of insider ownership allows effective control and there exists 
a non-value maximizing behavior. A firm’s ownership structure can be also impacted by 
its performance. Poorly performing firms’ shares are often sold by the shareholders 
which changes the ownership structure. Shareholders are profit-maximizers so this kind 
of behavior is endogenous in each firm. 
La Porta (1999) argues that the outside shareholders’ controlling often causes agency 
problems, since they use firm’s resources for their own benefit and this reduces 
shareholder value. A more concentrated ownership structure often leads to reduction of 
firm value which is appropriated by large shareholders. 
Differences between US and Japanese firms regarding ownership-performance relation 
are important which are shown first of all in corporate monitoring and information 
sharing. Ownership structure in Japan is characterized by the keiretsus, where the 
dominant shareholding firms are widely held. 
 
3.5.3 Outside blockholders’ influence on firm performance 
 
Large stakeholders are active at monitoring a firm’s performance. Increasing number of 
outside shareholders can be an indicator for the improvement of corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that if large shareholders come closer to control, they 
try to generate private benefits which are not shared with minority shareholders. 
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Hedge funds typically play an important role in corporate governance and corporate 
control. In the United States hedge funds are rather in profitable firms usual. These are 
short-term investments and investors get soon profit. Hedge funds’ influence on a firm’s 
performance in long-term is rather mixed. 
3.5.4 Influence of the market for corporate control on firm 
performance 
 
Managers can ensure their positions within a company by using anti-takeover devices if 
the takeover market is active. Bebchuk (2009) finds that external government forces can 
be hindered if management and board try to slow down hostile takeovers. If there are 
internal barriers for protection against hostile takeovers, value destruction can occur. 
Moreover, if the adoption of anti-takeover devices is disclosed, there can be negative 
abnormal returns concerning governance structure. Gompers (2003) reported that firms 
with stronger shareholder rights have higher abnormal returns. 
 
3.5.5 Relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance 
 
Good governance can influence board decisions especially in case of critical tasks. One 
of the most important decisions of board is the replacement of CEO if the firm is acting 
poorly. It has a serious impact on company’s investment, operating and financing 
decisions. CEO turnover (internal and external) was examined by Kaplan and Minton 
(2006) from 1992 to 2005 in large US firms. They reported that boards return to poor 
performance relative to the industry. Furthermore they respond also to poor market 
performance and industry. Between the relation of firm performance and CEO turnover 
ownership plays an important role. Boeker (1992) finds among US firms, if a firm is 
poorly performing and CEO has a high proportion of ownership, it is more probable that 
CEO will be dismissed than in case of lower proportion of ownership. Dahya (1998) in 
turn finds that in UK firms happens the opposite of it. If the CEO’s stake in the 
company is less than 1% the most probable is that he will be removed. Kato and Long 
(2006) reported that the relationship of CEO turnover and firm’s performance in China 
is strengthened by large controlling shareholders. Volpin (2002) examined the same 
relationship in Italy and finds if the control over the firm is in one hand and this one 
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shareholder owns less than 50% of the firm’s cash flow rights there exists a low 
sensitivity between performance and CEO turnover. Gibson (2003) examined 1200 
companies in 8 countries regarding effectiveness of corporate governance due to the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. He argues if the firm 
performance is poor CEOs are more likely to loose their positions. When a firm has a 
two-tier board structure, turnover is higher than in case of one-tier board structure. In 
Japan the situation differs from other countries. Those firms which are in financial 
trouble receive an outside director from the main bank. The probability of CEO’s 
dismissal at poorly performing is higher than in other countries. 
Based on the studies above about CEO turnover – firm performance relationship I find 
that the most important monitoring role is played by institutional investors. The inverse 
relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover is strengthened by both 
external and internal measures of corporate governance. 
 
3.6 Convergence of corporate governance: further approaches and 
studies 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) point out that the goal of corporate governance is 
shareholder value maximization. Gilson (2004) distinguishes between convergence in 
form and convergence in function. If convergence in form happens, legal frameworks 
and institutions are converging. In case of convergence in function, countries have 
different rules and institutions but they perform the same function. 
Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006) find another approach for convergence. They 
differentiate between de jure (similar corporate governance laws) and de facto (actual 
practices converge) convergence. 
The following Table 6 shows an illustrative listing about different dimensions of 
corporate governance which is also used for empirical studies. 
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Table 6. Convergence dimensions in corporate governance 
 
Source: Yoshikawa, Toru; Rasheed, Abdul A., Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review 
and Future Directions, 2009, Table 1 
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3.6.1 Drivers and Impediments of Convergence 
 
Figure 8. Convergence in Corporate Governance: An Analytic Framework 
 Source: Yoshikawa, Toru; Rasheed, Abdul A., Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review 
and Future Directions, 2009, Figure 1 
Convergence is the competition over “best practices” among countries. The integration 
of financial markets is one of the most important drivers. It is a primary driver because 
national financial markets became more and more integrated. Each action is very 
fundamental for convergence which also affects ownership structure’s transformation. 
The participation on international stock exchanges can increase firm valuation. Another 
way of integration is through cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Product market 
integration and the resulting global competition will have the same effect in the long-
run (Khanna and Palepu, 2004). Corporate governance can be seen as a new technology 
or innovation which can be adopted as best practices. This leads to convergence. The 
first code of good governance was the Cadbury Committee report (UK, 1992) which 
was followed by some developments. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) find that 
countries with weak shareholder protection, high government liberalization, and a 
strong presence of foreign institutional investors tend to develop the codes. 
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The following factors are the most important impediments to convergence: 
• Path dependence is an important impediment to convergence because in each 
country there are different historical events (e.g. banks play different roles in each 
country). Bebchuk and Roe (1999) distinguish between structure- and rule-driven 
path dependence. Structure-driven path dependence means that an ownership 
structure has a direct influence on subsequent ownership structures. The reasons of 
this kind of path dependence are rent seeking and efficiency. In case of rule-driven 
path dependence the initial ownership structure influents the follow structure by the 
influence of administer company with legal institution. The reasons are affections of 
other interest groups. 
• Complementarities are also impediments to convergence. Schmidt and Spindler 
argue a system is complementary if elements fit together well. 
• Multiple optima: Khanna (2006) argues that complementarities can induce multiple 
optima. Nations can end up choosing different bundles of practices that yield 
equivalent long-run corporate governance. There is only little chance to change from 
one system to another. 
• Rent seeking by interest groups: governance structures can exist in long-run even if 
they are suboptimal, because some parties resist change. Their private benefits 
would reduce if change occurs. 
• Differences in property rights regimes 
• Economic nationalism and differences in social norms 
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• Lack of consensus on an ideal: there is no optimal ownership structure, private 
benefits are always considered. 
During the last decades many studies were made on various governance dimensions. 
Table 7 shows a summary of studies on institutional/national and firm levels. 
Table 7. Convergence dimensions in corporate governance 
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Source: Yoshikawa, Toru; Rasheed, Abdul A., Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review 
and Future Directions, 2009, Table 2 
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3.7 Takeover regulation’s convergence 
Takeover regulation is an important element of corporate governance. Changes in 
takeover regulation can affect changes in ownership and control. “There is as yet no 
consensus as to the best system of corporate law and whether legal convergence should 
be encouraged on a global level. Some law and economics academics proclaim the 
superiority of the shareholder-oriented corporate governance system, characterized by 
well-developed capital markets, the prevalence of institutional investors, good investor 
protection, a market for corporate control, and a focus on shareholder value.” 8 
La Porta (1997) argues that in those systems which exist in common law countries, 
investors show a higher willingness to pay return to the shareholders. 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) find that if corporate law’s shareholder-centered 
ideology is accepted by countries, this would lead to corporate-law reforms which mean 
that results would be achieved in the convergence of corporate governance towards the 
Anglo-Saxon system. Convergence makes only in that case sense if political and 
institutional barriers are eliminated. Gilson (2000) argues that a contractual convergence 
of best corporate practice should exist. 
“Although takeover regulation is mainly seen as a mechanism to facilitate efficient 
corporate restructuring (Burkart(1999)), it is also an important in terms of mitigating 
conflicts of interests between diverse company constituencies such as management, 
shareholders, and stakeholders. Takeover regulation does not only curb conflicts of 
interests related to transfers of control, but also has a more general impact on the agency 
problems between management and shareholders, minority and majority investors, and 
other stakeholders. As such, it constitutes an important element of a corporate 
governance system, its corporate governance role, however, depends on other 
characteristics of the governance system such as ownership and control.” 9 
In the last decade, the European Commission tried to harmonize takeover regulation. A 
Takeover Directive was created in 2004, but it was not adopted. There is no consensus 
                                                 
8
 Goergen Marc, Martynova Marina, Renneboog Luc, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From 
Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, page 3 
 
9
 Goergen Marc, Martynova Marina, Renneboog Luc, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From 
Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, page 6 
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about the best corporate governance system, yet. It is still a question if EU countries 
change their regulation in order to have a common corporate governance system. There 
have been already steps taken toward convergence, but this does not mean that 
corporate governance systems are converging towards a single optimal system. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
 
Since globalization is happening in the world, convergence of corporate governance 
systems became also common. There will be probably no country which adopts 
regulations and rules completely of another country. Convergence is rather the 
movement of different systems towards a common mean. Capital will flow into those 
countries which are more globalized and stable. I think that convergence will go on but 
there will never be a “best corporate governance system”. 
As it was shown in the thesis, there are many different cultures and countries and they 
cannot really be compared to each other. In my point of view is the ownership structure 
the most sensible factor regarding convergence of different systems. Ownership 
structure functions as an endogenous outcome of decisions. Stakeholders can be 
influenced at decision making by many factors. They do not always decide objectively. 
If a privately held company decides to sell shares and a publicly held company has a 
secondary distribution, their ownership structures can be changed and become more 
diffuse. If takeover exists, those decisions who own shares are reflected in ownership 
structure. The profit-maximizing attitude of shareholders influences decision-making 
mostly. 
I think that the most important thing in order to have a well performing company is to 
keep in mind that stakeholders shall find always the possible “best solution” for the 
firm. Owners and managers should work together and they should consider firm’s 
interest and not the own profit. 
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Deutscher Abstract 
 
Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Konvergenz von Corporate Governance Systemen. 
Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden der Begriff Corporate Governance definiert sowie die 
grundlegenden internen und externen Mechanismen bestimmt. Außerdem werden die 
angelsächsische, die germanistische, die japanische und die spanische Corporate Governance 
Systeme mit Schwerpunkt auf Eigentümerstrukturen beschrieben. 
Das nächste Kapitel behandelt die Dimensionen von den erwähnten Strukturen und die 
Entwicklung der Corporate Governance Systeme in den letzten Jahrzehnten. Die Möglichkeiten 
zur Konvergenz vor allem aufgrund von Unternehmenserfolg und Übernahmeregulierung aus 
der Sicht der verschiedenen Interessensgruppen werden besprochen. Es wird auch eine 
Zusammenfassung über die Forschungstätigkeiten, die Hindernisse und die Treiber der 
Konvergenz beschrieben. 
Da die Globalisierung nicht zu vermeiden ist, spielt die Konvergenz von Corporate Governance 
Systemen in den letzten Jahrzehnten auch eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Wahrscheinlich wird es nie 
ein Land geben, das die Regeln von einem anderen Land vollkommen übernimmt. Konvergenz 
ist eher die Bewegung von einem System Richtung ein anderes.  
Um ein gut funktionierendes Unternehmen zu haben, ist wichtig, dass die Interessensgruppen 
immer die beste Lösung für die Firma zu finden versuchen. 
 
  
60 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Linda Tamas-Szora wurde am 02. April 1981 in Budapest, Ungarn geboren. Sie 
besuchte die Österreichische Schule (Oberstufenrealgymnasium) in Budapest. Nach 
Abschluss der Matura studierte sie Internationale Betriebswirtschaft an der Universität 
Wien. Während des Studiums verbrachte sie ein Praktikumssemester bei einer 
Beratungsfirma in Ungarn. Ihre Vertiefungen absolvierte sie aus 
Produktionsmanagement und Finanzdienstleistungen. Linda Tamas-Szora verfasste ihre 
Diplomarbeit über „Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems” unter Betreuung 
von Professor Burcin Yurtoglu. 
 
